In service: 10-8 Vol.19: Iss.5, 2019 by Justice Institute of British Columbia
A PEER READ PUBLICATION
Be Smart & Stay Safe Volume 19 Issue 5
IN SERVICE: 10-8
“Many people stopped by a police officer will feel 
compelled to remain and answer questions, 
regardless of the circumstances. ... Informing a 
person that their participation is voluntary may not 
be sufficient on its own and additional steps may 
need to be taken to ensure the person does not feel 
compelled to cooperate.”
Foreword
BC Provincial Policing Standards
BCPPS 6.2 Police Stops 
BC RELEASES STANDARDS ON 
POLICE STOPS
British Columbia’s Director of Police Services has 
released new Provincial Policing Standards 
promoting unbiased policing. The Foreword to the 
Standards states the Director has implemented 
them, which take  effect January 15, 2020, to 
address the police practice of “street checks” and 
the over representation of Indigenous persons and 
racial minorities amongst those street checked.
“The term police stops is intended to refer to any 
interaction between a police  officer and a person 
that is more than a casual conversation and which 
impedes the person’s movement,” states the 
foreword. “A stop may include a request or 
demand for identifying  information depending on 
the circumstances. ... Officers are  not permitted to 
request or demand, collect, or record a person’s 
identifying information without a justifiable reason.” 
The Standards will “also require police agencies to 
provide written direction to police officers 
regarding interactions that may result in a request 
for a person to voluntarily provide identifying 
information. The officer must reasonably believe 
there is a public safety purpose or objective they 
are attempting to address, and the officer must 
explain the reason to the person. It is also the 
responsibility of the officer to take steps to ensure 
that the person understands their right to not 
answer questions and to walk away.”
This is a work in progress and further Standards are 
yet to be completed. Section 6.2.1 Promotion of 
Unbiased Policing - Police Stops is available 
here.
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Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
The JIBC’s Advanced Training Program provides 
in-depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for 2019
          
Standard Field Sobriety Training @ New 
West Campus: November 18-21
Major Crimes Investigations @ New West 
Campus: November 18-22
Field Trainers @ New West Campus: 
November 19-20
Field Trainers @ New West Campus: 
November 21-22
Intoximeter Training  @ New West Campus: 
November 25-29
Standard Field Sobriety Training @ New 
West Campus: December 9-12
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
**2019 Course Calendar here** 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN THE 
LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Bring your brain to work: using cognitive science 
to get a job, do it well, and advance your career.
Art Markman.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2019.
HF 5381 M268 2019
Helping people change: coaching with 
compassion for lifelong learning and growth.
Richard E. Boyatzis (PhD), Melvin Smith (PhD), & 
Ellen Van Oosten (PhD).
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2019.
BF 637 P36 B69 2019
The identity trade: selling privacy and reputation 
online.
Nora A. Draper.
New York, NY: New York University Press, 2019.
HD 9696.8 U62 D73 2019
Inquiry and research: a relational approach in the 
classroom.
Michelle Reale.
Chicago, IL: ALA Editions, 2019.
ZA 3075 R43 2019
A mindfulness-based stress reduction workbook. 
Bob Stahl, PhD, Elisha Goldstein, PhD; foreword by 
Jon Kabat-Zinn, PhD; afterword by Saki Santorelli, 
EdD.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc., 
2019.
RA 785 S73 2019
Nobody's victim: fighting psychos, stalkers, pervs, 
and trolls. 
Carrie Goldberg with Jeannine Amber.
New York, NY: Plume, 2019.
HQ 1237 G63 2019
Overcoming everyday racism: building resilience 
and wellbeing in the face of discrimination and 
microaggressions.
Susan Cousins with Cheryl Hill.
London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2019.
E 184 A1 C68 2019
Risk assessment: tools, techniques, and their 
applications. 
Lee T. Ostrom & Cheryl A. Wilhelmsen.
Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
HM 1101 O88 2019
The rules of security: staying safe in a risky world.
Paul Martin.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
HV 7431 M37 2019
See what you made me do: power, control and 
domestic abuse. 
Jess Hill.
Carlton, VIC: Black Inc., 2019.
HV 6626.23 A8 H55 2019
Talking to strangers: what we should know about 
the people we don't know.
Malcolm Gladwell.
New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2019.
HM 1106 G58 2019
Trauma-sensitive mindfulness : practices for safe 
and transformative healing.
David A. Treleaven; foreword by Willoughby Britton.
New York, NY: W.W Norton & Company, 2018.
RC 531 T74 2018
Treating addiction: a guide for professionals.
William R. Miller, Alyssa  A. Forcehimes, & Allen 
Zweben.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2019.
RC 564 M546 2019
Wellbeing at work: how to design, implement and 
evaluate an effective strategy.
Ian Hesketh & Cary Cooper.
London; New York, NY: Kogan Page, 2019.
HF 5548.85 C657 2019
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
HEALTH 
SERVICES
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION
FIRE CHIEFS’ 
ASSOCIATION
 OF BC
CANADA 
BORDER 
SERVICES 
AGENCY
FIRST NATIONS 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES 
SOCIETY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
GREATER 
VANCOUVER 
FIRE CHIEFS
 ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE 
OF BC
TRANSIT 
POLICE
ROYAL 
CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
POLICE
AMBULANCE 
PARAMEDICS 
OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA
BRITISH
 COLUMBIA 
POLICE 
ASSOCIATION
www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 387
Quebec Provincial Police
5,356
Ontario Provincial Police
 5,668
Canada’s Police Officers by City - Top 10
CMA Officers % Change
Number per 100,000 2017>2018
Toronto, ON 4,923 167 -8.0%
Montreal, QC 4,532 223 -3.0%
Calgary,  AB 2,006 153 -11.0%
Peel Region,  ON 2,004 143 0.0%
Edmonton,  AB 1,882 187 +4.0%
York Region, ON 1,505 131 -6.0%
Winnipeg, MB 1,383 184 -3.0%
Vancouver, BC 1,341 198 +1.0%
Ottawa, ON 1,230 122 -3.0%
Durham Region, ON 878 128 +1.0%
POLICING ACROSS CANADA: 
FACTS & FIGURES
According to a  recent report 
released by Statistics Canada, 
there  were 68,562 active police 
officers across Canada in 2018. 
This represented a  decrease of 
-463 officers from the previous 
year. Ontario had the most police officers at 25,327, 
while the Yukon had the least at 132. With a national 
population of 37,058,856, Canada’s average cop per 
pop ratio was 185  police officers per 100,000 
residents.  
Total population: 37,058,856
Source: Statistics Canada, “Police Resources in Canada, 
2018”, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, October 3, 2019
2018
RCMP Training Academy 
& Forensic Labs  384
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2018 FAST FACTS
• On the snapshot day of May 15, 2018 there 
were 68,562  police officers in Canada. There 
were an additional 26,851  civilians, 2,539 
special constables and 1,660 recruits. There 
were 2.2 officers for every civilian employed.  
• Nova Scotia had the highest provincial rate  of 
police strength at 194  officers per 100,000 
residents (cop to pop ratio) followed closely by 
Manitoba and Quebec both at 189  officers per 
100,000. The Northwest Territories had the 
highest territorial cop to pop ratio at 416  officers 
per 100,000.
• 55% of police officers were 40 years of age or 
older. 
• 62% of OPP officers were over the age of 40.
• Officers over the age of 50 accounted for 18% 
of officers compared to 15% in 2012.
• For municipal police services serving a 
population of 100,000 or more, Montreal, QC 
had the highest police  strength at 223  officers 
per 100,000. This was followed by Victoria, BC 
(215) and Halifax, NS (210). Richelieu-Saint-
Laurent, QC had the lowest police strength at 
100 officers per 100,000. 
• In 2017/2018 the average salary  for a police 
officer was $99,298. The average salary 
reported by the OPP was $102,821 while the 
RCMP reported an average salary of $99,082. 
Municipal police services serving a population 
of 100,000 residents or more reported an 
average salary of $101,112  while small or 
medium municipal police services was 
$99,931.
• Of the officers hired, 61%  were  experienced 
police officers while 39% were recruits.
• BC had the highest net gain of police officers in 
2017/2018 at +247  followed by Alberta (+220), 
Quebec (+101) and Saskatchewan (+44). 
Ontario had the highest net loss at -175  officers 
followed by New Brunswick (-42), Prince 
Edward Island (-10) and Manitoba (-5).
• Ontario spent the most money on policing 
($5.720B) followed by Quebec ($2.810B), BC 
($1.869B) and Alberta ($1.726B). RCMP HQ, 
Training Academy and forensic  labs cost 
$1.618B.
Top 10 CMA Retirement Eligible     
Municipal Police Services 
Municipal Police Service Eligible to Retire %
St. John’s, NL 20%
Codiac Region (Moncton) NB 20%
Montreal, QC 17%
Halifax Regional, NS 16%
Delta, BC 13%
Levis, QC 13%
Chatham-Kent, ON 12%
Guelph, ON 10%
Kelowna, BC 10%
Langley Township, BC 10%
Vancouver, BC 10%
RETIREMENT
At the end of the 2017/2018, 11%  of police 
officers were  eligible to retire. Nova Scotia and the 
Yukon had the highest proportion of officers that 
could retire at 18%. This was followed by Prince 
Edward Island (17%), and both Newfoundland 
and Labrador, and New Brunswick at 16%. Forty 
percent (40%) of officers at RCMP Headquarters, 
the Training Academy and forensic labs could 
retire.
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GENDER
There were 14,943 female 
officers on May 15, 2018 
accounting for 22% of all 
officers, or about 1 in 5. This 
was up +196  female  officers 
f r o m 2 0 1 7 . T h e R o y a l 
Newfoundland Constabulary 
reported the highest proportion 
of female officers at 29%. The 
RCMP, Ontario Provincial 
Police and the municipal 
police services each reported 
22% of their officers as female 
wh i l e F i r s t Na t ion se l f -
a d m i n i s t e r e d s e r v i c e s 
accounted for 14%  of female 
officers. 
Senior officers, such as chiefs, 
deputy chiefs, superintendents, 
inspectors and other equivalent 
ranks, were 15%  female. Non-
commissioned officers, such as 
sergeants, were 19%  female. 
Constables were 23% female.
HOMICIDES OF POLICE OFFICERS
There were a total of 148  homicides of police 
officers from 1961 to 2018. That represents an 
average of five (5) homicides every two (2) years. 
Ontario lost the most officers (48) followed by 
Quebec (43) and the Prairies (30). Atlantic Canada 
lost 13 officers during this same time period 
followed by BC (11) and the Territories (3).
ASSAULTS AGAINST PEACE OFFICERS
According to Statistics Canada there were 11,627 
assaults against peace officers in 2018. This is from 
10,965 from 2017, an increase of 662  assaults. This 
increase represents a +5% change over 2017.
Of the 11,627 assault against peace officer offences 
reported in 2018 only 45 were concluded as 
unfounded. In 2017 there were 11,024 reports with 
59 unfounded occurrences. Of the assaults against 
peace officers, 678  were reportedly committed by 
youth in 2018, down from 701 reported in 2017. 
(Source: Statistics Canada, 2019, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2018, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 22, 2019.) 
RCMP Officers by Type of Policing - Canada 2018 (numbers do not include members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Contract 5,855 2,795 1,091 867 - - 689 856 98 439 118 168 122 13,098
Federal & 
Other
819 425 - 128 1,709 912 117 125 22 74 14 18 14 4,377
Total 6,674 3,220 1,091 995 1,709 912 806 981 120 513 132 186 136 17,475
City % 
Fem
Longueuil, QC 34
Montreal, QC 33
St. John’s, NL 29
Coquitlam, BC 28
Terrebonne, QC 28
Kelowna, BC 27
Quebéc, QC 27
Langley Township, BC 26
Regina, SK 25
Roussillon, QC 25
Vancouver, BC 25
Victoria, BC 25
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HOMICIDES AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS - 1999 to 2019
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www.statcan.gc.ca
©Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Industry, 2019
1 Canada includes personnel from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police operation and corporate headquarters, training academy depot division and forensic labs. This is not represented on the map.
Note: data on police personnel, women in policing, visible minority, Indigenous people are based on a "snapshot date" of May 15, 2018, while the other data on this infographic represent the calendar year ending December 31, 2017 (or March 31, 2018 as some 
police services operate on a fiscal year basis). Percentages may not add up due to rounding.
Definitions for the different police personnel and police services used in this infographic, can be found in the Juristat article
Source:  Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Police Administration Survey, 2018 
“Police resources in Canada, 2018 “. Juristat. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X
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Change in rate of police 
strength from 2017
Number of police officers
Rate of police officers per 100,000 population, 2018
Change in rate from 2017
As of May 15, 2018, there were  68,562 police officers 
in Canada, 463 fewer than in 2017. This represents a 
rate of police strength of  185 officers per 100,000 
population, and marks a decline of 2% from the previous year.1
69% 
Police officers
2% 
Recruits
27% 
Civilians
3% 
Special constables
Women in policing
36% of special constables 
and 24% of recruits are femalePercent of police officers
78%
22%
There were 196 more female 
police officers than in 2017
15% of commissioned officers 
and 19% of non-commissioned 
officers are female
Women accounted for 71%  
of civilian positions in police 
services
of all police officers in Canada
self-identified as belonging to
a visible minority group
8%
ACROSS CANADA, POLICE SERVICES RECEIVED  12.8 million   CALLS FOR SERVICE 
36 First Nations self-administered police services
141 Municipal stand-alone 
police services  
3 Royal Newfoundland Constabulary 
(RNC) detachments 
180 Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) detachments 
87 Sûreté du Québec (SQ) detachments 
Police services across 
Canada in 2018
675 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detachments  
Police personnel
0
3
6
9
12
15 Operating expenditures for 
policing reached $15.1 BILLION, 
up 3% from 2017.
Salaries, wages 
and benefits
Other operating 
expenditures
$12.4
$2.7
Police operating expenditures
billions of dollars
The average police 
officer salary in
2018 was just over $99,000.
216
141
-4%
of police officers 
self-identified as Indigenous 
4%
Catalogue number: 11-627-M              ISBN number: 978-0-660-2193-6
Radios: $193.0 million
Software, applications and computer 
systems: $146.7 million
Other telecommunication devices: $85.4 million
Computers and hardware: $77.7 million
Police services 
across Canada 
spent $380.0 million 
on Information 
Technology (IT) 
operations and 
$284.2 million 
on police equipment
Police operating and capital expenditures
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The number of Reports to 
Crown Counsel (RCCs) 
r e c e i v e d b y t h e B C 
Prosecution Service from investigative agencies in 
fiscal 2018/19. These RCCs represented a total of 
73,412 accused persons. This was the third year in 
a row for which there was a decline in the number 
of RCCs received.
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2018/19”, accessed October 
11, 2019. 
. . . a s a 
percentage 
of overall 
accused named in an RCC submitted to the BC 
Prosecution Service has declined over the last three 
years.
... were the investigative agency 
most likely  to submit an RCC to 
the BC Prosecution Service. In 
fiscal 2017/18, police 
agencies submitted 
55,528 RCCs. This 
was followed by BC 
Corrections (13,279) 
and other investigative 
agenc i e s such a s 
wildlife conservation 
or financial regulators 
(1,555).
BC PROSECUTION SERVICE 
~ANNUAL REPORT~
70,362 Young Persons
65,000
67,000
69,000
71,000
73,000
2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
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71,294
72,994
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4.1%4.6%
4.7%
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19%
79%
Police Corrections Other
% of RCCs with Young Person
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The percentage 
o f a c c u s e d 
per sons tha t 
w e r e y o u n g 
persons (ages 12-17). In fiscal 
2018/19, the BC Prosecution 
Service approved to court 
59,565 accused persons. This 
consisted of 57,427 adults and 
2,138 young persons.
... was the BC Prosecution Services 
overall charge approval rate for RCCs 
submitted by investigative  agencies. 
Data extracted from the 69,734 
people named in RCCs for which their was a final 
charge assessment decision made in fiscal 2018/19 
resulted in an 85%  charge approval rate. 13% 
resulted in no charges and 2% were referred to 
alternative measures.
The percentage of prosecutions 
resulting in a conviction by way of 
a guilty  plea or guilty verdict at 
trial. Of the 59,821  prosecutions 
concluded in 2018/19, 60%  had a guilty finding, 
1% were not guilty, 4%  entered into a 
recognizance to keep the peace, 34% had their 
charges stayed, and 1%  were concluded otherwise, 
such as a finding of unfit to stand trial or not 
criminally responsible due to a mental disorder.
... was the most common reason why a prosecution 
was concluded with a Judicial Stay of Proceedings. 
In fiscal 2018/19 there was a total of 14 
prosecutions judicially stayed for a variety of legal 
reasons. Of those, 9  were stayed because of delay, 
up from 8  in fiscal 2016/17 and 2017/2018. About 
half of stays of proceedings directed by the BC 
Prosecution Service resulted in other consequences 
for the accused including referrals to alternative 
measures, a peace bond or a plea on another file.
The time it 
takes for 
BC Crown 
Counsel to undertake a  charge assessment in most 
cases. From the date an RCC is received until 
Crown Counsel makes a charge decision, 56% of 
cases take three days or less. 69% of decisions are 
made within 7 days, 80% within 15 days and 89% 
within 30 days. 
The median number of 
days (net of bench warrant 
days) it takes for a file to 
conclude from the time an information was sworn 
or filed (a  charge laid) to the date that all charges 
on the file have a final disposition. 
4.1% 4%
96%
Adults Young Persons
85%
60%
1%
34%
4%
1%
60%
Guilty
Not Guilty
Peace Bond
Stayed
Other
Unreasonable Delay
Within 3 Days
40%
60%
80%
100%
89%
80%
69%
56%
47%
Within	1	day Within	3	days
Within	7	days Within	15	days
Within	30	days
Charge	Assessment	Duration
93 days
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CROWN MUST PROVE REPLICA 
GUN NOT A FIREARM
R. v. Eyre, 2019 BCCA 333
The accused was arrested by  police 
on outstanding arrest warrants. In 
conducting  a  search incidental to 
arrest, a police officer found an 
Umarex PX4 Storm pellet pistol 
tucked into the accused’s waistband.  Police also 
located about two grams of methamphetamine in a 
pants pocket. Police seized the handgun and 
methamphetamine. Upon a closer examination of 
the pellet pistol, the officer noted it looked like a 
real Beretta PX4 handgun. At the time of this arrest, 
the accused was prohibited from possessing any 
firearms, weapons or prohibited devices, which 
included a replica firearm. One of the prohibition 
orders imposed was a lifetime ban. Among other 
things, the accused was charged with possessing  a 
prohibited device (a replica handgun) while 
prohibited from doing so and possessing 
methamphetamine.
British Columbia Supreme Court
A weapons expert provided a written 
opinion as to whether the device seized 
was appropriately described as a 
“replica”  of an actual handgun. The 
expert’s report referenced the RCMP “Firearms 
Reference Table” which included excerpts related 
to the Beretta PX4 Storm semi-automatic handgun 
and the Beretta PX4 Storm CO2 powered handgun 
manufactured by Umarex. The report described 
how the expert physically examined the pellet gun 
but the expert did not test fire it. The expert stated 
that “this pellet gun is classified as exempt from 
being a firearm in Canada due to the muzzle 
velocity of the pellets”, but the expert did not say 
whether the pellet gun was or was not a firearm as 
defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code.   
The accused agreed that the  pellet gun closely 
resembled a Beretta PX4 Storm. He testified that, 
prior to being arrested, he had shot at some tin 
cans and the pellets penetrated the cans. He said 
that the pellets could possibly  break someone’s skin 
and thereby injure them. He also said the pellet 
gun’s muzzle velocity was 380 feet/second but did 
not provide the manufacturer’s specifications.
The judge concluded that the pellet gun was not 
capable of causing  serious bodily  injury or death, 
and therefore was a  replica firearm. In his view, 
there  was no evidence the pistol was a “firearm” 
even though there was a warning stamped on it that 
read: “Misuse or careless use may cause serious 
injury or death.”  The accused was convicted of 
possessing a prohibited device—a “replica 
handgun”—while  prohibited from doing so and for 
possessing methamphetamine.  
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
The accused appealed his 
conviction for possessing a 
replica firearm arguing, in part, 
that the Crown failed to prove 
the pellet gun was a “replica firearm” as defined in 
s. 84(1) of the Criminal Code. He submitted that the 
pellet pistol was a “firearm” as defined in the s. 2. 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 2 Criminal Code
“firearm” means a barrelled weapon from 
which any shot, bullet or other projectile can be 
discharged and that is capable of causing 
serious bodily injury or death to a person, and 
includes any frame or receiver of such a 
barrelled weapon and anything that can be adapted for use 
as a firearm.
s. 84(1) Criminal Code
“replica firearm” means any device that is designed or 
intended to exactly resemble, or to resemble with near 
precision, a firearm, and that itself is not a firearm, but does 
not include any such device that is designed or intended to 
exactly resemble, or to resemble with near precision, an 
antique firearm.
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Replica Firearm
In this case, the Crown was required to prove that 
(1) the pellet gun resembled with near precision an 
actual firearm and (2) the pellet gun was not itself 
an actual firearm.
“To prove a particular pellet gun is a firearm the 
Crown will often tender evidence from an expert 
who test-fired that gun to establish that it has a 
muzzle velocity sufficient to cause serious bodily 
injury or death,” said Justice  Frankel, speaking for 
the Court of Appeal. “It is open to the Crown to 
prove a pellet gun is not capable of causing serious 
bodily injury or death other than by tendering 
opinion evidence from an expert who test-fired 
that gun.” However, in this case, the Crown sought 
to prove the pellet gun was not capable of  causing 
serious bodily  injury or death by means of an 
expert’s report based on information from the 
Firearm Reference Table (FIR). The expert did not 
opine on the pellet gun’s actual muzzle velocity or 
on its capability to cause harm:
[The expert’s] statement with respect to the 
pellet gun being “classified exempt from being 
a firearm … due to the muzzle velocity of the 
pellets” is no more than a statement that the 
gun is “deemed” not to be a firearm for certain 
purposes by reasons of s. 84(3)(d).  ... [A] pellet 
gun exempted under s.  84(3)(d) can still be a 
firearm for other purposes. Indeed, the FTR 
excerpt for the Umarex pellet gun supports the 
view that the pellet gun seized from [the 
accused] is a firearm as defined in s. 2. [para. 
35]
Since the expert’s report was silent about the pellet 
gun’s capability to cause harm, the trial judge’s 
finding that it was a replica  firearm (and not an 
actual firearm) was unreasonable.  The apparent 
incongruous result in this case of an acquittal—
since the accused was prohibited from possessing 
both firearms and replica firearms—turned “on 
how the Crown chose  to word the charge and the 
evidence it tendered in support of that charge.”
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction 
was set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
PROVING A PELLET GUN IS A 
FIREARM
The focus on whether a pellet gun meets the definition of 
a “firearm” depends on it nature (as a barrelled object) 
and its capability (to cause serious bodily injury or 
death), not the intent of its possessor nor the use made of 
it. Some barrelled objects are deemed not to be firearms if 
the shot, bullet or other projectile does not exceed a 
muzzle velocity of 152.4 m/s (500 ft/s). However, this 
velocity threshold deeming a barreled object as non-
firearms is only in relation to specific offences concerning 
the strict licensing regime of the Firearms Act and Criminal 
Code (eg. unauthorized possession, trafficking, importing/ 
exporting, failing to report or false reporting of lost, found, 
or destroyed firearms). Other offences such as carrying a 
concealed weapon (s. 90), careless handling (s. 86), and 
possession for a dangerous purpose (s.  88) are not subject 
to the 152.4 m/s threshold. 
R. v. Dunn, 2013 ONCA 539 aff’d 2014 SCC 69 the 
Ontario Court of Appeal described three different 
categories (or groups) of barrelled objects 
1. Group One: Barrelled objects shooting a projectile 
with a velocity of less than 214 ft./s. (or 246 ft./s., using 
the V50 standard) are not firearms because they are not 
capable of serious injury or death; these objects will 
only be considered weapons, and thus fall within a 
prohibition such as the concealed weapon prohibition 
in s. 90, if they meet paras. (a) or (b) in the definition of 
"weapon".
2. Group Two: Barrelled objects shooting a projectile 
with a velocity of  more than 214 ft./s. (or 246 ft./s., 
using the V50 standard) are firearms, because they are 
capable of causing serious injury or death, whether or 
not they also meet paras.  (a) or (b) in the definition of 
"weapon"; these weapons will fall  within a prohibition 
such as that found in s. 90. Nevertheless, they will not 
be subject to the stricter licensing regime in the 
Criminal Code and the Firearms Act if  they fall within 
one of the exemptions in s.  84(3), for example, if the 
velocity of the projectile does not exceed 500 f./s. 
3. Group Three: Barrelled objects shooting a projectile 
with a velocity of more than 500 f./s. These objects fall 
within the definition of firearm for all purposes of the 
Criminal Code and the Firearms Act and must be 
licensed accordingly. Some airguns and most powder-
fired bullet-shooting guns will fall within this regime.  
At a minimum, ... Group Three objects do not need to 
meet the paras.  (a) or (b) definition of weapon to be 
deemed to be weapons. [paras. 44-46]
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INVENTORY SEARCH LAWFUL: 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED
R. v. Knott, 2019 MBCA 97                   
The accused, who was wanted on 
outstanding warrants, and another 
man were observed by an off-duty 
police officer in a restaurant. The off-
duty  officer called on-duty officers 
who attended and arrested the accused. A bag on 
the seat beside the accused was searched incident 
to arrest.  In the bag, police found a loaded 
handgun, a large amount of methamphetamine, 
marihuana, cash, drug paraphernalia and the 
accused’s identification cards. The police had prior 
information connecting  the accused with a white 
Ford F150. A similar truck was in the restaurant’s 
parking lot and keys to the truck were with the 
accused when he was arrested. The truck’s licence 
plate belonged to a rental company but none of the 
e x p e c t e d r e n t a l v e h i c l e 
identification features were noted 
on the truck. The police  seized 
and searched the truck before it 
was towed to a secure compound.  
Manitoba Provincial Court
The police said the truck  was seized for 
further investigation and searched 
before being towed to ensure there were 
no other weapons, determine ownership 
and inventory its contents. More drugs, firearms, 
and identification of the accused were found in the 
truck, which were later seized pursuant to a search 
warrant.
The judge ruled the seizure and search of the truck 
did not violate s. 8 of the Charter. In the judge’s 
view, police had authority under Manitoba’s 
Highway Traffic  Act to seize the vehicle and 
inventory its contents. The seized items found 
inside the truck were admitted and the accused was 
convicted of numerous firearm and drug  offences 
along with three counts of possessing firearms 
while prohibited. He was sentenced to 11 years’ 
incarceration. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal 
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial 
judge erred in failing to find a 
s. 8 Charter breach and in not 
excluding the seized items from the truck as 
evidence under s. 24(2).
Justice Spivak, speaking for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found the trial judge did not err in 
concluding  that the accused’s s. 8 rights were not 
violated:
The trial judge held that the police had 
authority pursuant to The Highway Traffic Act, 
CCSM c H60 (the Act), to seize and search the 
truck. Section 242 of the Act permits detention 
of a vehicle when an officer has reason to 
believe that an offence contrary to the Act or 
the Criminal Code has been committed in 
WHAT POLICE FOUND
According to a Winnipeg Police media release at the time of 
this event, police seized the following items:
• $9814.50 Canadian currency
• 0.39 grams of an unknown substance
• 2 magazines - 1 loaded with Luger 9mm ammunition
• 56.4 grams Marijuana
• 63.38 grams of powder cocaine
• 79.3 grams of Methamphetamine
• A black "bear claw" shredding tool
• A box of shotgun shells
• A hatchet
• A Sturm Ruger, Mini 30, "Ranch Rifle" with a magazine 
loaded with three rounds of ammunition
• An SKS style semi-automatic rifle
• Gun Holster
• Loaded 9mm Sawed-off Semi-Automatic Rifle
• Rifle ammunition
• Score Sheets
• Smith and Wesson Model 659 handgun
• Two "banana clip" style high capacity magazines, one 
loaded with ten to twelve rounds of ammunition.
• Two Cell Phones
• Weigh digital scale
• Winchester Air Pistol
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relation to the vehicle. The evidence of the 
police at trial was that the truck needed to be 
seized for further investigation, given the 
firearms and drugs found in the bag in the 
accused’s possession, and to ascertain the 
lawful owner of the vehicle.  We agree with the 
t r ia l judge tha t i t would have been 
unreasonable for the police to leave the truck, 
associated with the accused who was in 
possession of a handgun and drugs, in a public 
parking lot. Having assumed legal custody of 
the truck, the police were justified in 
inventorying its contents. [references omitted, 
para. 7]
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE SUSPICION MORE 
THAN SINCERELY HELD 
SUBJECTIVE BELIEF
R. v. Sahouli, 2019 PECA 14 
Police began a drug trafficking 
investigation, code named “Project 
Lurid”. It started with informer tips. 
The drug trafficking operation was 
fairly  high level and involved moving 
drugs between Montreal and the Maritimes. During 
the investigation the police obtained Criminal Code 
judicial authorizations, including  tracking warrants 
(s. 492.1), data number recorders (s. 492.2), general 
warrants (487.01) and a wiretap authorization. 
When police raided an apartment where the 
accused was present, they seized, among other 
things, $44,840 in cash, marihuana, ammunition, 
numerous cell phones, a money counter, and zip 
lock bags.  As a result of the investigation, The 
accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic in a 
controlled substance. Others were charged as well.
Prince Edward Island Supreme Court
The accused sought to excise all 
evidence obtained from two data 
number recorder warrants because, he 
argued, the requisite reasonable 
suspicion on which they could issue  was not met. 
Further, he  submitted that once the information 
from the data number recorder warrants was 
excised from the  wiretap authorization, it too 
should not have been granted. 
The judge dismissed the applications to exclude the 
evidence from the two data number recorder 
warrants. In assessing  the reasonable suspicion 
standard, the judge referred to dictionary 
definitions that included “reasonable”  as meaning 
“not irrational or absurd”  and the word 
“suspicion” as meaning  “1)  imagination of 
something that is possibly likely, 2)  a faint belief 
that something is the case, 3)  a notion, 4)  an 
inkling, 5) a  hint, 6) an intuitive feeling.”  He also 
described the reasonable suspicion standard “as a 
hunch, even a hunch based on experience”. 
The judge also found that the information in the 
ITO was credible, compelling and corroborated. He 
described this as, in part, a “hindsight based test.” 
The informers were credible (the information was 
100% accurate), the information was compelling 
(the police found the drugs as expected) and the 
information was corroborated (every police source 
or informer agreed the accused and others were 
trafficking in marihuana). The accused was 
convicted and he was sentenced to two years in 
prison.
“Having assumed legal custody of the 
truck, the police were justified in 
inventorying its contents.”
“Reasonable grounds to suspect means reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is 
not the same thing as reasonable grounds to believe. Both concepts must be grounded 
in objective facts and stand up to independent scrutiny. However reasonable suspicion 
is a lower standard as it engages reasonable possibility rather than probability.”
Volume 19 Issue 5 ~ September/October 2019
PAGE 15
Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal
The accused contended, 
among other things, that the 
t r ia l judge er red in his 
application of the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard. He suggested that the judge 
also used hindsight reasoning in finding the ITO 
established reasonable suspicion. 
  
Reasonable suspicion
 
Justice Mitchell, authoring the opinion for the 
Court of Appeal, first noted that “a justice may 
issue a  warrant authorizing a peace officer to 
obtain transmission data, commonly called data 
number recorder, where a justice is satisfied on 
information on oath that there are  reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the transmission data will 
assist in the investigation of an offence.” 
 
In Justice Mitchell’s view, the  trial judge clearly 
misunderstood the application of the reasonable 
suspicion test.  “Reasonable grounds to suspect 
means reasonable suspicion,” said Justice Mitchell. 
“Reasonable suspicion is not the same thing as 
reasonable grounds to believe.  Both concepts 
must be grounded in objective facts and stand up 
to independent scrutiny.  However reasonable 
suspicion is a lower standard as it engages 
reasonable possibility rather than probability.”  
 
The trial judge incorrectly interpreted reasonable 
suspicion. “The law is quite clear that reasonable 
suspicion is not simply a suspicion nor is it a 
hunch, a notion or a feeling,” said Justice  Mitchell. 
“It means … ‘something more than a mere 
suspicion and something less than a belief based 
on reasonable and probable grounds.’  A sincerely 
held subjective belief is not sufficient.  A 
reasonable suspicion must be supported by factual 
elements which can be adduced in evidence and 
permit an independent judicial assessment.”
 
Hindsight Reasoning Not Part Of Analysis
 
In determining whether the information in an ITO 
is credible, compelling and/or corroborated, an 
after-the-fact analysis is not appropriate. “The fruits 
of a  search can never be used, ex poste facto, to 
justify  the search,”  said Justice Mitchell.  “The 
grounds for the search must exist before the 
search is carried out, and in this case, the 
reasonable suspicion must exist prior to the  data 
number recorder warrant being issued.  The trial 
judge's focus ought to have been on whether the 
reasonable suspicion existed before the  search was 
carried out, not afterwards.”
 
The accused’s appeal was allowed and the matter 
was sent back to Prince  Edward Island Supreme 
Court for a  new trial. At the new trial, a judge can 
rule on whether the information obtained from the 
two data number recorders should be excised from 
the wiretap authorization and whether the 
evidence obtained from the wiretap authorization 
is admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Sahouli, 2018 PECA 8
“The law is quite clear that reasonable suspicion is not simply a suspicion nor is it a 
hunch, a notion or a feeling.  It means … ‘something more than a mere suspicion and 
something less than a belief based on reasonable and probable grounds.’  A sincerely 
held subjective belief is not sufficient.  A reasonable suspicion must be supported by 
factual elements which can be adduced in evidence and permit an independent judicial 
assessment.”
Ex	Post	Facto	(Latin):	after	the	fact;	
done,	 made,	 or	 formulated	 after	 the	
fact.
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REASONABLE SUSPICION 
STANDARD SATISFIED: 
NO ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Li, 2019 BCCA 344
Police received an anonymous Crime 
Stoppers tip involving a phone 
number that the  tipster alleged 
belonged to a dial-a-dope operation. 
The tipster also stated that the 
operation involved the  sale  of cocaine from a tan 
Honda Odyssey minivan and the vehicle’s licence 
plate number was provided. The officer taking the 
tip recorded the information on a document. Police 
database queries related to the phone number were 
negative. A check of the licence plate number 
showed it was registered to an Odyssey minivan. A 
PRIME (Pol ice  Records and In format ion 
Management Environment) query revealed that the 
registered owner of the licence plate had an 
extensive history of suspected drug trafficking 
through dial-a-dope operations, including several 
recent reports. Motor vehicle records also revealed 
that the registered owner had five other vehicles 
registered in his name. When police placed a call 
to the phone number it rang twice, then 
disconnected. The  officer recorded on the 
document that he had a reasonable suspicion that 
the phone number was a dial-a-dope drug line.
Police subsequently selected the phone number for 
an attempted undercover drug purchase. An officer 
called the phone number. It was answered by a 
man. The officer asked how the man was doing, 
and he responded that he was “good”. The man 
then asked who was calling, and the officer said it 
was “J” or “Jen”. The man said “Okay”. He did not 
ask any follow up questions, so the officer stated 
that she wanted “half of soft”, a street term for half 
a gram of powder cocaine. The man said that he 
could meet her, and they arranged to meet at a 
supermarket. About half an hour later, they met in 
the parking lot, and negotiated a purchase of 0.75 
grams of powder cocaine for $80. Over the 
following months, the police made an additional 
21 drug purchase transactions as part of their 
investigation. The  accused was involved in 16 of 
these transactions.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused pled guilty to one count of 
trafficking in cocaine. However, he 
argued that he was entrapped and that 
the proceedings should be stayed. The 
judge agreed and found that when the officer made 
her initial phone call, the police did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was a drug 
trafficker or that the phone number was affiliated to 
a dial-a-dope operation. “Nothing in the original 
tip was corroborated or linked by external police 
investigation,” said the judge. “While the police 
may have had a mere  suspicion, this is not 
sufficient. The police did not corroborate the 
original tip either connecting [the  accused] 
personally with the vehicle or telephone number 
in the Crime Stopper tip, or connecting the phone 
number and vehicle or registered owner of that 
vehicle. The tip contained no other information to 
corroborate such as names, descriptions, or 
accents.”
Further, “the police  did not achieve an objectively 
reasonable suspicion through investigative steps 
after calling the phone number and giving the 
opportunity to commit the offence,” said the 
judge. When the officer called the phone number, 
she engaged the accused in a  criminal transaction 
for cocaine without taking investigative steps or 
gaining  additional information.“[The officer’s] 
request for a half of soft was not an investigative 
step at an opportunity to traffic. It was a request 
for a particular type and amount of drugs. She 
engaged in transactional language that only 
required [the accused] to say  yes for the offence to 
be complete. She offered him an opportunity to 
traffic by  offer without reasonable suspicion.” As a 
consequence, a stay of proceedings was entered.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown challenged the  trial 
judge’s ruling on entrapment. 
The Court of Appeal first 
reviewed the  concept of 
entrapment. It noted that entrapment can occur in 
the following ways:
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1. the authorities provide an opportunity to a 
person to commit an offence:
• without a reasonable suspicion the  person 
is already engaged in the particular criminal 
activity; or 
• the pol ice under take a  bona f ide 
investigation directed at an area where it is 
reasonably suspected that criminal activity 
is occurring. 
2. having a reasonable suspicion, they go beyond 
providing an opportunity and induce the 
commission of an offence.
Reasonable Suspicion
In this case, Justice Grobermen, speaking for the 
Court of Appeal, concluded that the  trial judge 
failed to consider the tip as a whole rather than 
separating the information into parts. There was no 
need for the tip to identify  the accused personally 
by name nor were the police required to establish, 
independently  of the tip itself, that the telephone 
number belonged to a dial-a-dope operation. 
Rather, it was only necessary that the police 
establish a reasonable suspicion that the number 
called was one dedicated to drug trafficking 
through a dial-a-dope operation given the details of 
the Crime Stoppers tip and the preliminary 
information uncovered in police investigations:
While the Crime Stoppers tip was from an 
anonymous informant of unknown reliability, 
aspects of the tip enhanced its credibility. The 
tip referred to a vehicle that the police were 
able to connect to a person who appears to 
have been involved in several dial-a-dope 
operations. The police were entitled, in the 
circumstances, to attach considerable weight to 
the tip. [para. 18]
In summary, the judge erred in requiring 
specific corroboration of all elements of the tip. 
Such corroboration was unnecessary. Rather, 
what was required was that the police had 
sufficient information to harbour a reasonable 
suspicion that they were calling a phone 
number attached to a drug trafficking operation. 
[para. 24]
The police officers also operated as a team, rather 
than as separate  individuals, and the officer making 
the telephone call was entitled to take action based 
on the advice of her colleagues.
The Appeal Court noted that “the reasonable 
suspicion standard is not an onerous one.”  It is 
something more than a mere suspicion but less 
than reasonable and probable grounds. In some 
cases, the standard has not been met where the 
police have acted on anonymous tips of 
indeterminate credibility and no attempt had been 
made to investigate. In other cases, “very limited 
confirmatory evidence has been held to be 
sufficient to transform an anonymous tip (or a  tip 
of uncertain credibility) into ‘reasonable 
suspicion’.”  In this case, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the  reasonable suspicion standard 
had been satisfied:
[S]ome details of the tip were confirmed: the 
correspondence between the licence plate 
number and the Honda Odyssey, and the 
apparent involvement of the vehicle’s owner 
with dial-a-dope operations. Those elements of 
confirmation were sufficient to give the police 
reasonable suspicion that the number they 
called was associated with a dial-a-dope 
operation. [para. 32]
Thus, the police had a  reasonable suspicion before 
providing the accused with the opportunity to sell 
cocaine to an undercover officer.
“In summary, the judge erred in requiring specific corroboration of all elements of the tip. 
Such corroboration was unnecessary. Rather, what was required was that the police had 
sufficient information to harbour a reasonable suspicion that they were calling a phone 
number attached to a drug trafficking operation.”
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A Bona Fide Investigation?
The police were also involved in a bone fide 
investigation in which they could approach a 
person and attempt to purchase drugs. Here, the 
police were undertaking a bona fide investigation 
where  it was reasonably suspected that criminal 
activity was occurring. In this case, “the police  had 
information that was sufficient to label the 
telephone number ‘suspicious’,”  said Justice 
Groberman. “The limited inquiries made by [the 
police  officer] can properly be characterized as 
investigative in nature. The actual transaction to 
purchase the drug occurred later, and only after 
negotiations at the [supermarket].”
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the stay of 
proceedings lifted, and the matter was remitted 
back to the trial court for sentencing. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
FURTIVE & FIDGETY 
MOVEMENTS PROVIDE 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING POSSESSION
R. v. Hebrada-Walters, 2019 MBCA 102 
Two police officers conducted a 
traffic stop on a vehicle in which the 
accused was in the back seat. As the 
officers approached the vehicle, they 
observed the accused fidgeting with 
his hands on the left side of his body and glancing 
down to his left side. Despite the officers’ warnings 
to keep his hands up and on the back of the seat in 
front of him, he continued to drop his left hand 
towards his waist. Concerned for officer safety, one 
of the officers pulled the accused from the back 
seat of the vehicle. As the officer looked back into 
the vehicle, he saw a handgun on the seat of the 
vehicle where the accused had been seated. The 
gun was a  45 calibre  Glock handgun. The slide 
portion of the gun was on the seat and the handle 
was up, positioned against the back of the seat. A 
front seat passenger was also found in possession of 
a handgun. The accused was charged with 
numerous firearm offences including possessing a 
loaded restricted firearm, unauthorized possession 
of a firearm in a motor vehicle, possessing a firearm 
knowing the  serial number had been removed and 
possessing a firearm while prohibited from doing 
so.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found the evidence that the 
accused was in possession of the 45 
calibre Glock handgun “clear and 
overwhelming.” He stated:
The testimony of [the officer] setting out [the 
accused’s] furtive glances and fidgeting conduct 
are consistent with [the officer’s] opinion that 
[the accused] was attempting to access or 
conceal something while he was being 
instructed to show his hands.  When [the 
accused] was removed from the vehicle as a 
result of his failure to comply with the officer’s 
request, the Glock handgun was then plainly 
seen in the immediate area of where he had 
been sitting in the vehicle. No other article of 
any type was present on the seat of the car.
I agree with the Crown’s argument that the 
Glock firearm was in the direct possession of 
[the accused] and that the essential elements of 
possession as required by s. 4(3) of the Code, 
including knowledge, custody and control are 
established by the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt. [paras. 33-34, 2018 MBQB 
6]
The judge rejected the accused’s argument that 
there  was a  reasonable doubt because  no police 
officer actually saw the Glock in the accused’s 
hands. In doing so, the judge concluded that “there 
[was] no reasonable inference other than guilt on 
the basis of the evidence here, and the Crown’s 
evidence meets the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” The accused was convicted and 
globally sentenced to six years in prison.
Bona	 Fide	 (Latin):	 "good	 faith";	
refers	to	a	quality	of	genuineness.	
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Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that 
the t r ia l judge erred in 
convicting him because there 
was no direct evidence of 
possession and the circumstantial evidence was 
equally consistent with innocence as it was with 
guilt. 
Justice Pfuetzner, delivering the Appeal Court’s 
opinion, disagreed with the accused. In his view, 
the trial judge did not err in drawing the inferences 
he did in finding the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt had been met. He also agreed 
“with the trial judge’s assessment that the evidence 
was overwhelming, that there was no reasonable 
inference other than guilt and that the elements of 
possession were established beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”
 
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Hebrada-Walters et al., 2018 MBQB 6.
NO COMMON LAW POWER TO 
ARREST TARGET OF BREACH OF 
THE PEACE 
Fleming v. Ontario, 2019 SCC 45
 
During a longstanding land dispute 
between the Crown and the  First 
Nation of Six Nations of the Grand 
River, S ix Nat ions protes tors 
occupied a piece of land. In the 
course of the protest, some protesters hung 
Indigenous flags along the street running in front of 
the occupied property. The Crown subsequently 
purchased the piece of land and permitted the 
protesters to continue to occupy the property. 
Other groups in the community organized counter-
protests against the occupation. Violent clashes 
between the  sides arose. On numerous occasions, 
the O.P.P. were called in to deal with the violence 
sometimes using  police  lines and buffer zones to 
allow the two groups to demonstrate peacefully 
near one another. 
One day, a counter-protest group held a “flag rally” 
to protest the land’s occupation, the flying of 
Indigenous flags along the street, and the O.P.P.’s 
actions. The plan for the flag rally was to march 
down the street and raise a Canadian flag across 
the street from the occupied land’s front entrance. 
The O.P.P. were aware of the flag  rally  and 
developed an operational plan to ensure public 
safety while allowing all groups to express 
themselves peacefully. Protesters would be kept 
apart and no flag rally participants would be 
permitted to enter the occupied land. Police 
informed the organizers of the flag rally that they 
would not be allowed on occupied land but no 
police line or buffer zone was put in place on the 
day of the rally. 
On the day of the rally, the plaintiff began walking 
down the street towards the place where the rally 
was to be held. He was carrying a  Canadian flag on 
a 40” to 42” wooden pole. As the plaintiff walked 
on the shoulder of the road, police drove past him. 
Police turned around and headed towards the 
plaintiff with the intention of placing themselves 
between him and the entrance to the  occupied 
land. The plaintiff saw the approaching police 
vehicles and, to avoid them, moved off the 
shoulder, down into a  grassy ditch, up the opposite 
side and over a low fence onto the occupied land. 
Officers exited their vehicles and began yelling 
various commands at the plaintiff, including “stop” 
and “return to the shoulder”. He did not realize 
that the officers were speaking to him because he 
believed he was not doing anything wrong.
The protesters on the  occupied land, about 100 
meters away, reacted to the plaintiff stepping onto 
the property. Eight to 10 of them began moving 
towards the plaintiff’s location, some walking and 
some jogging. None of the protesters were  carrying 
weapons, none uttered any threats and the plaintiff 
did not say anything to the protesters. With the 
protesters still 10 to 20 feet away, an officer 
approached the plaintiff, told him that he was 
under arrest, took him by the arm and led him back 
across the fence, off the occupied property. Police 
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ordered the plaintiff to drop his flag but he refused. 
The officers then forced him to the  ground, took his 
flag and handcuffed him. He was placed in a 
transport van, moved to a jail cell and released 
about 2.5 hours after his arrest. He was charged 
with obstructing a peace officer by resisting arrest 
but the charge was withdrawn by  Crown some 19 
months after it was laid. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
The plaintiff sued the province of 
Ontario and seven OPP officers 
involved in his arrest. He said his left 
arm was yanked behind his back as he 
was being handcuffed, causing him severe pain and 
a lasting injury. He claimed general damages for 
assault and battery, wrongful arrest, and false 
imprisonment, as well as aggravated or punitive 
damages, and damages for breaches to his ss. 2(b), 
7, 9, and 15 Charter rights. 
The trial judge  found in the plaintiff’s favour. She 
held that the police had intended to prevent the 
plaintiff from walking down the street with a 
Canadian flag and that he was arrested without 
legal authority. The plaintiff had broken no law 
prior to his arrest and the police had no power to 
arrest him to prevent an apprehended breach of the 
peace. There was no violence or harm to anyone, 
nor was any breach imminent or substantial. She 
also found that the officers’ concern over the 
plaintiff’s safety had been based not on the actual 
events of the day, but rather on a  generalized 
concern rooted in past violence. There were less 
invasive options that could have defused the 
situation, such as setting  up a buffer zone between 
the plaintiff and the protesters. 
The judge concluded that the torts of false  arrest, 
unlawful imprisonment and battery  had been made 
out. She  also found the plaintiff’s rights under ss. 
2(b), 7 and 9 had been violated when the police 
had unlawfully  arrested him and prevented him 
from attending a political demonstration, but no s. 
15 breach had been established. The plaintiff was 
awarded general damages, special damages, tort 
damages and Charter damages. The defendants 
were also ordered to pay costs in the amount of 
$151,000.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
A m a j o r i t y a l l o w e d t h e 
defendants’ appeal, concluding 
that the police had the authority 
at common law to arrest the 
plaintiff for an anticipated breach of the peace. 
Amongst other things, the majority found the police 
had been acting in the execution of their duty to 
keep the peace and protect the public. The 
protesters rushing towards the plaintiff posed a real 
risk to his safety, which threatened a breach of the 
peace. The police were therefore justified in taking 
action to prevent harm to the plaintiff and a likely 
breach of the peace. While  other options may have 
been available, there was no need to resort to them 
if the situation could be easily  addressed by 
removing the plaintiff from the property, especially 
since alternative measures could have inflamed 
tensions. The majority set aside the trial judge’s 
award of damages and ordered a new trial on the 
issue of excessive force.
Justice Huscroft, in dissent, found there was no 
basis to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion 
that the officers had not been justified in arresting 
the plaintiff. In his view, the plaintiff’s arrest had not 
been a valid first resort, even in the face of 
potential illegal violence, the risk of which was 
neither imminent nor substantial. The police power 
DAMAGES AWARDED BY SUPERIOR 
COURT
✓ $80,000 in general damages 
✓ $10,000 in damages for false arrest, 
wrongful imprisonment and breach 
of right to pass 
✓ $12,986.97 in special damages
✓ $5,000 in damages for a s. 2(b) 
Charter breach.
✓ No aggravated or punitive damages.
Total: $107,986.97
Source: Fleming v. Ontario, 2018 ONCA 160
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to arrest someone for an apprehended breach of the 
peace is exceptional, and exercising it was not 
justified in this case. Justice Huscroft would have 
dismissed the defendants’ appeal.
Supreme Court of Canada
Th e p l a i n t i f f 
appealed the 
ordering of a 
new trial. In his 
view, his arrest 
was not lawful because he had committed no 
crime, broken no law, was not about to commit any 
offence, harm anyone or breach the peace. And a 
unanimous seven member panel of the  Supreme 
Court of Canada agreed. 
The Central Issue
Justice Côté, delivering the unanimous Supreme 
Court decision, framed the main issue in 
determining whether the police  acted lawfully in 
arresting the plaintiff this way:
[W]hether, and in what circumstances, the 
police have a common law power to arrest 
someone who is acting lawfully in order to 
prevent an apprehended breach of the peace. 
Does the common law permit police officers to 
arrest individuals who have not committed any 
offence, who are not about to commit any 
offence, who have not already breached the 
peace and who are not about to breach the 
peace themselves? [para. 36]
Justice Côté  also made clear that this case was not 
about a power to arrest a person for the purpose  of 
preventing that person from breaching the peace. 
Instead, this case addressed the power to “target 
individuals who are  not suspected of being about 
to break any law or to initiate any violence 
themselves.” In other words, this was not about the 
power to arrest someone who was personally about 
to breach the peace but about arresting someone 
whose conduct may provoke others to breach the 
peace, believing their removal from the area would 
defuse the situation, avert the apprehended 
violence and even protect that person.
Lawful Authority?
The defendants cited no statutory authority to 
justify  the plaintiff’s arrest. However, in some cases 
the common law can proscribe police powers and 
thereby justify an arrest. Here, the Supreme Court 
defined the police power as “a power to arrest 
someone who is acting lawfully  in order to prevent 
an apprehended breach of the peace. In targeting 
someone who is acting lawfully, this proposed 
power is aimed at individuals who have not 
committed, and are  not about to commit, either an 
indictable offence or a breach of the peace.”
Breach of the Peace
In defining the term “breach of the peace”, the 
Supreme Court noted that “violence lies at the core 
of this concept.” “An act can be considered a 
breach of the peace only if  it involves some level 
of violence and a risk of harm,”  said Justice Côté. 
“It is only in the face of such a serious danger that 
the state’s ability to lawfully interfere  with 
individual liberty comes into play. Behaviour that 
is merely disruptive, annoying or unruly is not a 
breach of the peace.”
Although Justice Côté  did not find it necessary to 
determine whether a power to arrest a person to 
prevent that person from breaching the peace 
exists, he seriously questioned whether a common 
law power of this nature would still be necessary in 
Canada today.
“[A]n act can be considered a breach of the peace only if it involves some level of 
violence and a risk of harm. It is only in the face of such a serious danger that the state’s 
ability to lawfully interfere with individual liberty comes into play. Behaviour that is merely 
disruptive, annoying or unruly is not a breach of the peace.”
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Ancillary Powers Doctrine
In determining whether police  actions ancillary  to 
the fulfillment of recognized police  duties that 
interfere with individual liberty  are permitted at 
common law as reasonably  necessary, courts use a 
two stage test:
• The Police Duty: Does the police action at 
issue fall within the general scope of a statutory 
or common law police duty?
• Reasonably Necessary: Does the action involve 
a justifiable exercise of police powers associated 
with that duty? Or, in other words, was the 
police action reasonably necessary for the 
fulfillment of the duty? This analysis includes 
weighing the following factors:
• the importance of the performance of the 
duty to the public good.
• the necessity  of the interference with 
individual liberty for the performance of the 
duty.
• the extent of the interference with individual 
liberty.
Justice Côté found the police action in this case did 
fall within the general scope of a statutory or 
common law police duty:
[T]he purported police power falls within the 
general scope of the  duties of preserving  the 
peace, preventing crime, and protecting life 
and property.
... ... ...
Preventing breaches of the peace, which 
entail violence and a risk of harm, is plainly 
related to these duties. [paras. 69-71]
As for whether the action involved a justifiable 
exercise of police powers associated with the 
police duty, Justice Côté explained there were three 
reasons why it would be more difficult to justify this 
police power as reasonably necessary compared to 
other common law powers:
• its impact on law-abiding individuals: This 
power would expressly be exercised against 
someone who is not suspected of any criminal 
wrongdoing or even of threatening to breach the 
peace. 
• its preventative nature: This power would 
enable the police to act to prevent breaches of 
the peace before they arise. Courts must be very 
cautious about authorizing  these arrests merely 
because  an unlawful or disruptive act could 
occur in the future. Vague or overly permissive 
standards in such situations would sanction 
profound intrusions on liberty with little societal 
benefit. As a general rule, it will be more 
difficult for the state  to justify invasive police 
powers that are preventative in nature than 
those that are  exercised in responding to or 
investigating a past or ongoing crime.
• it would be evasive of review: Since this power 
of arrest would generally not result in the laying 
of charges, the  affected individuals would often 
have no forum to challenge the legality of the 
arrest outside of a costly civil suit. Judicial 
oversight of the exercise of such a police  power 
would therefore be rare. 
Ultimately, Justice Côté determined that the power 
to arrest someone acting lawfully in order to 
prevent an apprehended breach of the peace did 
not meet the  reasonably  necessary test for the 
fulfillment of the relevant police duties. Although 
there  was no doubt that preserving the peace and 
protecting people from violence are  important, 
utilizing  the drastic power of arrest where there 
were less invasive measures available that would be 
effective in preventing the breach rendered the 
arrest not reasonably necessary. If an individual 
fails to comply with less intrusive measures taken 
by a police officer to avert a  breach of the peace, 
then the power of arrest found in s. 495(1) of the 
“As a general rule, it will be more difficult for the state to justify invasive police powers 
that are preventative in nature than those that are exercised in responding to or 
investigating a past or ongoing crime.”
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Criminal Code  for the offence of obstructing a 
peace officer, assaulting the officer, or omitting to 
assist the  officer in preserving the peace after 
having reasonable notice of a requirement to do so 
may arise. 
 
The [defendants’] purported power of arrest 
would result in serious interference with 
individual liberty. As a result, such an arrest 
cannot be justified under the ancillary powers 
doctrine. There is already a statutory power of 
arrest that can be exercised should an 
individual resist or obstruct an officer taking 
other, less intrusive measures. It is not 
reasonably necessary to recognize another 
common law power of arrest in such 
circumstances. Therefore, to be clear, the only 
available powers to arrest someone in order to 
prevent an apprehended breach of the peace 
initiated by other persons are the ones that are 
expressly provided for in the Criminal Code. In 
my view, these statutory powers are sufficient, 
and any additional common law power of 
arrest would be unnecessary. [para. 95]
Hence, the plaintiff’s arrest was unlawful. “Because 
there is no common law power to arrest someone 
who is acting lawfully in order to prevent an 
apprehended breach of the  peace, the officers in 
this case did not have lawful authority to arrest 
[the plaintiff],” said Justice  Côté. “The [defendants] 
have not ... cited or relied on any statutory power 
to arrest [the plaintiff]. They do not claim that the 
arrest was authorized pursuant to s. 129, s. 270, s. 
495(1)(a) or any other provision of the Criminal 
Code. They  rely entirely on a common law power 
to arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order 
to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace by 
other persons — a power that I have found to be 
non-existent.”
Excessive Force
As for the use of force used to arrest the plaintiff, 
Justice Côté  stated:
[Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code] authorizes 
police officers to use “as much force as is 
necessary” in the execution of their duties. It 
affords them a defence to a claim of battery, 
provided that the section’s requirements are 
satisfied. The provision will not shield officers 
from liability if the force they used is found to 
be excessive.
However, police officers cannot rely on s. 25(1) 
to justify the use of force if they had no legal 
authority  —  either under legislation or at 
common law — for their actions.
Because the [defendants] were not authorized 
at common law to arrest [the plaintiff], no 
amount of force would have been justified for 
the purpose of accomplishing that task. They 
were not doing what they were “required or 
authorized to do” within the meaning of s. 
25(1). [references omitted, paras. 116-118]
As a result, there was no new trial required on 
whether or not police used excessive force. The 
police were liable for battery for their use of force 
in making the unlawful arrest.
The plaintiff’s appeal was allowed, the order for a 
new trial was set aside, and the trial judge’s verdict 
was restored. Additional costs for the appeal of 
$48,000 were also awarded. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
BY THE BOOK:
s. 25(1) Criminal Code
Protection of persons acting under 
authority
s. 25  (1)  Every one who is required or 
authorized by law to do anything in the 
administration or enforcement of the law
(a) as a private person,
(b) as a peace officer or public officer,
(c) in aid of a peace officer or public officer, or
(d) by virtue of his office,
is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what he 
is required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is 
necessary for that purpose.
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REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR 
ARREST LOWER THAN BALANCE 
OF PROBABILITIES
R. v. Glendinning, 2019 BCCA 365
At about 8:40 p.m. a plainclothes 
officer of a police  drug section was 
surveilling a downtown area known 
for its high levels of street-level drug 
use. It was on the edge of a “red 
zone”—an area in which drug trafficking  was 
common. The officer noticed a female drug user 
walking along the street. The officer had surveilled 
the woman before and saw her purchase drugs two 
years earlier in the same area. The officer saw the 
woman walk to a nearby dog park and look at 
vehicles as they approached. About five  minutes 
later, a black Dodge pickup truck occupied by its 
driver and a passenger stopped by the woman. She 
ran up to the passenger side, remained there for 
about 10 seconds, and then walked away. The truck 
then left. The officer believed the occupants of the 
truck had just sold the woman drugs. The officer 
noted the truck’s licence plate number and alerted 
other officers about his observations, and requested 
assistance.
Another drug section officer saw the truck  again at 
9:07 p.m. and followed it. There were two 
occupants. The truck came to a stop in front of a 
man in his 20s who was waiting on a corner. There 
was no bus or taxi stand nearby. The young man got 
into the rear passenger side of the truck. The truck 
then moved slowly around a cul-de-sac and then 
stopped. The young man got out of the truck and 
walked away from it. Police  decided they had 
enough grounds to arrest both occupants for 
trafficking in drugs. They boxed in the  truck. The 
driver of the truck (the accused) was recognized as 
the same individual who had been driving at the 
time of the  meet with the female drug user. He 
appeared panicky and was fidgeting with his arms. 
Both the accused and his passenger were arrested.
The accused was searched and found in possession 
of 14 pieces of individually packaged crack 
cocaine weighing 10.59 grams in total and 22 
pieces of an individually packaged heroin/fentanyl 
mix weighing 7.51 grams in total. The accused, 
along with his passenger, was charged with 
possessing controlled substances for the purpose of 
trafficking.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge concluded that the police 
had the requisite reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused, both subjectively 
and objectively. “The Crown is not 
required to establish that it was more likely than 
not that an indictable  offence was about to or had 
occurred,” said the judge. “Rather, the Crown 
must establish a reasonable belief or probability 
on the totality of the circumstances.” The two 
independent interactions the police had observed, 
when viewed in their totality along with the 
officers’ experience, were sufficient to provide 
reasonable grounds of dia l -a-dope drug 
transactions. The female was known to an officer as 
a drug user and addict, she was in an area where 
she had previously met with a drug supplier and 
the interaction had lasted only 10 seconds. Plus 
there  was the slow movement of the truck in the 
cul-de-sac and a brief meeting with a man waiting 
on the street. The judge stated:
…[B]o th se t s o f i n t e rac t ions w i th in 
approximately 30 minutes of each other had 
many consistencies with the off icers’ 
knowledge and descriptions of dial-a-dope 
transactions, including the presence of a 
waiting purchaser on the side of the road, the 
short interaction time, the open door, and the 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 495(1)(a) Criminal Code
Arrest without warrant by peace officer
s. 495 (1) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence ...
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occasional entry into the vehicle by the 
purchaser for a short duration, a vehicle ride 
that does not change the location of the 
purchaser substantially, and the parting of the 
purchaser and the seller in different directions. 
With respect to the first interaction, its location 
was also consistent with known dial-a-dope 
drug transactions generally, and for that drug 
purchaser in particular. 
And even though innocent explanations might have 
been available for the two transactions, none was 
satisfactory from a common sense perspective. 
Furthermore, it was not necessary for the officers to 
rule out such possible innocent explanations. There 
was no s. 9 Charter breach (arbitrary detention) nor 
was the search that followed as an incident to arrest 
unreasonable (s. 8). The evidence was admissible 
and the accused was convicted of possessing 
controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
police did not have the 
necessary  reasonable grounds 
for belief required for an arrest 
under s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code. In his view, 
the trial judge applied the wrong test in finding the 
arrest lawful. Thus, he submitted that his rights not 
to be  arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, and to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure were 
violated.
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
Justice Newbury, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
upheld the trial judge’s ruling. In finding that the 
police met the reasonable grounds standard, she 
outlined a  number of considerations in determining 
whether the threshold for arrest was satisfied:
• “There can be no doubt about the importance 
of ensuring that Canadians are not deprived of 
their rights under ss.  8 and 9 of the Charter, 
and that judicial scrutiny of police conduct in 
acting without warrants must be meaningful.”
• “What is meant by ‘reasonable grounds’ in 
[the arrest] context, and in other contexts in 
the Code, is in my view quite  clear. The phrase 
‘reasonable grounds’ is regarded as the 
equivalent to ‘reasonable and probable 
grounds,’ the phrase used in the predecessors 
to s. 495(1) in the Code prior to 1988.”
• “Although the word ‘probable’ or ‘probably’ 
appears in some of the  foregoing authorities, I 
do not read them as contravening the notion 
that the s.  495(1) standard is lower than the 
‘balance of probabilities’ standard in civil 
law.”
Defence Position On Missing 
Dial-a-Dope Factors
Factors the defence emphasized that are often present in 
dial-a-dope operations but which were not present in this 
case:
• The truck used by the accused was not a rental;
• The individuals operating the Truck were not known to 
the police;
• The truck was not known to police;
• The driver did not engage in any typical behaviours of 
a dial-a-dope seller to detect police surveillance, 
referred to as a “heat check”;
• There was no hand-to-hand exchange observed nor any 
related activity such as reaching in a pocket, or putting 
things away in a pocket or purse;
• There was no cellphone use observed;
• There was no tip, this investigation occurred simply as 
a result of observations during a patrol; and
• One of the transactions took place in an area that was 
not known to these officers as a drug “hot spot”. 
“[T]he law is clear: the Crown need not demonstrate that the belief of the police (that an 
indictable offence had occurred) was correct on a balance of probabilities. Rather, the 
arresting officer must have subjectively believed an offence had occurred and that belief 
must have been objectively reasonable from the viewpoint (or through the “lens”) of a 
person with the officer’s experience and training.”
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• “[I]t is also well-established that ‘reasonable 
grounds’ imports a test or standard that is 
lower than the  standard of civil proof, or proof 
‘on the balance of probabilities’.”
• “[T]he law is clear: the Crown need not 
demonstrate that the belief of the police (that 
an indictable offence had occurred) was 
correct on a  balance of probabilities. Rather, 
the arresting officer must have subjectively 
believed an offence had occurred and that 
belief must have been objectively reasonable 
from the viewpoint (or through the ‘lens’) of a 
person with the officer’s experience and 
training.”
• “In the context of s. 495(1), which is applied 
not at the end of a  trial but in various 
situations in the ‘real world’ in which peace 
officers find themselves, it would be 
impractical to require proof on a ‘balancing’ 
of probabilities by police officers. The 
evidence available to them is obviously 
limited; they are not finders of fact; and their 
decisions must often be made quickly.”
• “[T]he officer must have grounds that tend to 
support his or her subjective belief — i.e., that 
make the belief more likely or more 
“probable” than it would otherwise be — and 
that those grounds must be  objectively 
defensible, such that the line between ‘mere 
suspicion’ and ‘reasonable belief’ is crossed. 
The officer must be able to explain what 
objective factors, when considered through 
the ‘lens’ of his or her experience and training, 
led to the belief.
Here, the trial judge did not err in describing the 
“reasonable grounds” standard and applying it. 
Even though the accused pointed out (1) the 
absence of factors common in dial-a-dope 
operations, (2) the absence of any observed hand-
to-hand exchanges of drugs and (3) the two year 
span from when the officer last interacted with the 
known female drug user, Justice Newbury 
recognized that “the police officer had to make his 
decision based on what he did observe, not on 
what he did not see.”
“In my view the conduct observed by the  officers 
was highly suspicious and it was not unreasonable 
for the police officers here to form the opinion 
that a drug transaction had occurred and that the 
driver of the truck was trafficking in drugs on the 
day in question’” said Justice  Newbury. “While it is 
true that police must not take a cynical or highly 
suspicious approach to what they see, neither 
should they be naïve or overly  cautious in 
enforcing the laws of the land. Their belief must be 
reached based on the totality of the circumstances, 
again including their particular expertise  and 
experience in drug investigations.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LACK OF CREDIBILITY NOT 
OVERCOME BY TIP’s DETAIL OR 
CORROBORATION
R. v. Pavlik, 2019 SKCA 107
At 8:39 p.m. a police officer 
belonging to an Integrated Street 
E n f o r c e m e n t Te a m r e c e i v e d 
information from a confidential 
informer that the accused would be 
arriving at a named bar in about 20 minutes. The 
informer said the accused would be driving a red 
car belonging to his girlfriend, Ms. Werminsky, who 
would be with him. The two would be in 
p o s s e s s i o n o f m u l t i p l e o u n c e s o f 
methamphetamine and would be selling it. The 
officer passed this information off to a sergeant and 
told him that the accused was “arrestable”. The 
sergeant asked no questions about the  informer or 
their prior involvement with police. 
The sergeant queried the vehicle and learned the 
description and licence plate number of the red 
“[I]t is also well-established that ‘reasonable grounds’ imports a test or standard that is 
lower than the standard of civil proof, or proof ‘on the balance of probabilities’.”
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vehicle was registered to Ms. Werminsky. At 8:52 
p.m., the sergeant passed on the details of the tip to 
other officers who drove to the bar, arriving shortly 
before 9:00 p.m. Upon their arrival, police saw a 
red car, matching the description provided, near 
the building. Before the  police could cover all the 
exits to the bar, the red vehicle went mobile. Police 
confirmed that the licence plate  number but the 
accused was not in it. He was seen walking in the 
parking lot near an entrance to the bar.
Police stopped the red car and confirmed Ms. 
Werminsky  was driving it. She was arrested for 
possessing a controlled substance for the purpose 
of trafficking. The accused was also arrested for the 
same offence. He was searched and so was the car, 
which had been towed to the  police station. In the 
car, police discovered a loaded, sawed-off, 12-
gauge shotgun (a  prohibited weapon) in the trunk. 
The accused subsequently gave a  warned statement 
to the  police  in which he admitted to possessing 
the shotgun and denied the female had any 
knowledge of it because he didn’t want her to get 
in trouble.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused argued the police had 
lacked the necessary grounds to arrest 
him. He contended that police 
corroboration of the details of the tip 
did not lend enough credibility to the allegations of 
criminal conduct to support his warrantless arrest. 
In his view, his s. 9 Charter rights were breached 
and the search of the vehicle was unreasonable and 
violated s. 8. He also contended that his warned 
statement was not voluntary. He sought to exclude 
the shotgun and the warned statement on the 
grounds that his arrest and the search of the vehicle 
were unlawful.
The judge concluded that the accused’s arrest was 
lawful under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. 
Since there was little evidence about the credibility 
of the informer, including their motivation or 
reliability, the judge held the informer’s credibility 
was weak and only slightly better than that of an 
anonymous tipster. However, he found the tip was 
precise and detailed enough, in terms of time, 
location and people involved, to support the arrest. 
In the judge’s view, the level of detail ruled out 
mere coincidence, indicating it had been provided 
by someone with personal knowledge of the 
accused’s activities and whereabouts. Moreover, the 
police had corroborated most of the information in 
the tip and all of the “neutral” information. The 
female named by the informer owned a red car and 
she and the car had been seen in the bar’s parking 
lot within the time period set out in the tip. 
As for the search of the car, the judge concluded 
that the accused did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Ms. Werminsky’s car. 
Thus, the  accused’s s. 8 rights had not been 
engaged by its search. The accused’s warned 
statement was also found to be voluntary. The 
shotgun and the warned statement were admitted 
and the accused was convicted of several firearm 
related offences.  
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused alleged the trial 
judge erred by concluding that 
the police had, in the totality 
o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
reasonable grounds to believe he had committed or 
was about to commit the indictable offence under 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act of 
possessing methamphetamine—a controlled 
substance—for the purpose of trafficking and was 
therefore “arrestable” without warrant under 
s. 495(1)(a). He argued the police breached s. 9 of 
the Charter by arresting him and that the sawed-off 
shotgun and the warned statement he made to the 
police ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2).
Reasonable Grounds to Arrest
Justice Caldwell first described s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code as follows
Put in broad terms, when the lawfulness of a 
warrantless arrest under s. 495(1)(a) is 
challenged, the application of the standard of 
“reasonable grounds to believe” involves the 
court’s objective assessment of whether the 
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police subjectively believed the individual 
arrested had committed or was about to 
commit an indictable offence and whether the 
observations and circumstances articulated by 
the police are rationally capable of supporting 
that belief. ....
Therefore, a reviewing court must critically 
evaluate the grounds for arrest that have been 
advanced by the Crown but, as noted, the 
required degree of probability of such criminal 
conduct having occurred or occurring is not 
high—it is lower than a prima facie case for 
conviction. [references omitted, paras. 20-21]
In assessing reasonable grounds for arrest based on 
an informer’s tip, a reviewing court must consider 
the totality  of the circumstances including (1) 
whether the information predicting the commission 
of a criminal offence was compelling, (2) whether 
the informer was credible and (3) whether the 
informat ion was corroborated by pol ice 
investigation prior to making the decision to arrest.
In this case, the police officer who received the 
informer’s tip, assessed the informer’s credibility, 
and advised on-the-ground police officers that the 
accused was “arrestable” did not testify at trial. 
Hence, there was no information about the 
informer, their reliability, or their history with the 
police. 
As for the weakness of the  informer’s credibility, it 
could not be sufficiently compensated by the 
compelling  nature of the tip and its corroboration 
by police. Although the trial judge found the tip to 
be compelling—to a degree—it was “just barely 
better than a ‘bald conclusory statement’,”  said 
Justice Caldwell. “There was no evidence as to: 
(i)  how the tipster had acquired the information; 
(ii) whether [the accused] had prior convictions for 
drug-related offences; (iii) whether Ms. Werminsky 
(the other participant in the anticipated offence) 
had convictions for drug-related offences; and (iv) 
whether the police had knowledge that [the 
accused] and [the female] were reputed to be drug 
users and traffickers.” Justice Caldwell continued:
The tipster advised where [the accused] would 
be in 20 minutes (which, as noted, the police 
knew to be a site for drug deals), with whom he 
would be, what type vehicle he would be in, to 
whom the vehicle would belong, who would 
be driving it, and the illegal activity in which 
they would be participating, including the 
general amount of methamphetamine they 
would have in their possession. This 
information had enough detail to allow for a 
conclusion that the tip was more than gossip or 
rumour but, because [the accused] and 
Ms.  Werminsky had no reputation with the 
police, it is not much more than a “bald 
assertion” that they were dealing drugs... . The 
information contained in the tip suggests the 
tipster was familiar with [the accused] and his 
personal a f fa i r s , which lends to the 
persuasiveness of the tip. However, the tip lacks 
certain details, and the details it does provide 
are not more than what someone might be able 
to say even having no familiarity with the 
alleged criminal activity of [the accused]. 
[references omitted, para. 33]
As to the level of corroboration or verification of 
the tip, it was weak. “Even though there is no 
general requirement that they do so, the police 
were unable to corroborate any criminal activity, 
or any activity that, although not illegal, could be 
viewed as reasonably anticipatory to illegal 
activity on the part of [the accused] or 
“Put in broad terms, when the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest under s. 495(1)(a) is 
challenged, the application of the standard of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ involves 
the court’s objective assessment of whether the police subjectively believed the individual 
arrested had committed or was about to commit an indictable offence and whether the 
observations and circumstances articulated by the police are rationally capable of 
supporting that belief.”
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Ms. Werminsky,”  said Justice Caldwell. “This gap in 
the corroborative evidence when taken alongside 
the lack of specificity of the criminal activity 
alleged in the tip, and the lack of any background 
or reputational knowledge linking [the accused] or 
Ms.  Werminsky to the type of criminal activity 
anticipated by the tip (or any previous criminality, 
for that matter), barely moves the needle off mere 
speculation that [the accused] was about to 
commit a drug-related indictable offence.”
The Court of Appeal found the  “the best that could 
be said is that the police had objectively 
reasonable grounds to suspect that either [the 
accused] or Ms. Werminsky were about to commit 
the indictable offence of trafficking in a  scheduled 
substance. However, because the police had not 
observed any activity from which they could have 
drawn an inference that a drug-related indictable 
offence was about to occur or was occurring, they 
did not have an objectively reasonable basis to 
believe that [the accused] was about to commit a 
drug-related indictable offence.” Justice Caldwell 
stated:
In my assessment, the overall corroborative 
effect of the police observations was not 
meaningful in the context of the tip in question. 
Moreover, it failed to overcome the absence of 
evidence as to the tipster’s credibility, the lack 
of detail and specificity as to the criminality 
alleged in the tip, and the lack of background 
knowledge on the part of the police linking the 
suspects to the alleged criminality. ... [para. 39]
Although he found the arresting officers honestly 
held a subjective belief that they had sufficient 
grounds to arrest the accused, Justice Caldwell was 
unable to conclude objective reasonable grounds 
existed. “Given that they had received a tip with 
some compelling details, and had corroborated 
most of the neutral circumstances it predicted, the 
on-the-ground officers had grounds to subjectively 
believe that [the accused] had or was about to 
commit an indictable offence and was, therefore, 
subject to being arrested under s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code,”  he said. “[However], the absence 
of evidence as to the credibility of the tipster or as 
to what had supported [the officer receiving the 
tip’s] assessment that [the  accused] was 
“arrestable” critically undermined the Crown’s 
ability to prove that it was in fact objectively 
reasonable in the circumstances for the police to 
have arrested [the accused] without a warrant.” 
The accused’s arrest was unlawful and therefore  it 
was arbitrary and breached s. 9. 
Admissibility of Evidence?
The Court of Appeal excluded the shotgun and the 
accused’s warned statement under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter. Although the conduct of the police was on 
the lower side of the scale of seriousness, its 
seriousness nevertheless favoured exclusion. As for 
the impact of the Charter breach of the accused, he 
was arbitrarily deprived of his liberty when arrested 
and then his person was searched. His detention 
was not fleeting. The police also obtained a warned 
statement from him during his unlawful detention 
where  he admitted to possessing the shotgun. This 
warned statement was tainted by his arbitrary 
detention. And without his statement, there  was no 
evidence linking him to Ms. Werminsky, her 
vehicle or the shotgun. The impact of the s. 9 
breach favoured the exclusion of the shotgun and 
the statement. As for society’s interest of a trial on 
its merits, the reliability of the shotgun as evidence 
favoured its inclusion. The statement, however, was 
given in circumstances where the accused did not 
want Ms. Werminsky to get into trouble, which 
called into question its reliability. Thus, this 
weighed against its admission.
Without the excluded evidence, the Crown’s case 
against the accused was not provable. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions were 
set aside and acquittals were entered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“If you are working on something that 
you really care about, you don’t have to 
be pushed. The vision pulls you.” 
~Steve Jobs~
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COURT ORDERED SEARCH 
PROVISION DID NOT 
AUTHORIZE SEARCH AGAINST 
CO-RESIDENT
R. v. Arnault, 2019 SKCA 109
The accused, a high-risk  offender, 
resided with another man, also a 
high-risk offender. Both men were 
bound by recognizance orders 
prohibiting them from purchasing 
and consuming alcohol and drugs, prohibiting the 
possession of weapons, and each was subject to an 
11:00 p.m. curfew. The co-tenant also had a  search 
clause, which was not a  condition of the accused’s 
recognizance. The co-tenant’s search clause read as 
follows:
One evening, five police officers belonging to the 
Guns and Gangs unit knocked on the door of the 
men’s residence. An officer spoke to both men near 
the back door. She told the accused’s co-tenant that 
police would be enforcing the cursory search 
condition in his recognizance. The accused 
objected to the police right to enter vis-à-vis him 
and emphasized the absence of a  search clause in 
his recognizance.
The police asserted their right to undertake a 
cursory search and proceeded into the house. 
Police found two visitors sitting on a mattress 
watching television and saw a spoon with residue 
on it, consistent with drugs. A bladed weapon was 
also seen in an open closet and alcohol was 
observed on the kitchen table, which one of the 
visitors claimed had been brought into the home to 
share with the accused. There were  also needles 
readily observable throughout the residence  as the 
search progressed through the house. 
About five minutes after the officers entered the 
residence, one of them pulled back a cushion from 
a black leather sofa  in the living  room of the house 
and discovered a sawed-off shotgun. All of the 
occupants were arrested, including the accused 
who was believed to also be in violation of many 
conditions of his recognizance. He was provided 
with his Charter rights and warnings and was told 
that he was being arrested for the possessing the 
firearm and a drug investigation. A more thorough 
warrantless search of the residence was then 
conducted by police under the authority of the 
accused’s recognizance. More weapons, drugs and 
drug paraphernalia were discovered. The accused 
was subsequently charged with the Criminal Code 
offences of carelessly storing a  firearm (s.  86(1)), 
possessing a firearm without a license (s.  92(1)), 
possessing a prohibited firearm with ammunition 
(s.  95(1)(b)), possessing a  weapon for a purpose 
dangerous to public peace (s.  88), possessing a 
firearm contrary to a court order (s. 117.01(1)) and 
breach of recognizance (s.  811). He was also 
charged with possessing methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (s. 5(2)).  
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused argued that the warrantless 
search was unlawful and that his rights 
under s.  8 of the  Charter  had been 
violated. He also sought exclusion of 
the evidence under s.  24(2). The Crown, on the 
other hand, argued the evidence leading to the 
accused’s arrest was either found in plain view or 
was obtained pursuant to the cursory search clause 
in the order. Finally, the Crown contended that the 
search was non-intrusive  and executed within the 
confines of what was permitted.
The judge found the accused not only had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the  shared 
dwelling, but that the warrantless search was also 
unreasonable. Even though the accused was a 
tenant – and not the owner of the home – it was his 
home for s. 8 Charter  purposes and he had a high 
expectation of privacy in it. As for his reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the home, it was not 
That you shall upon demand of a peace officer, 
submit to a cursory search of your person, 
residence, and motor vehicle for possession of 
alcohol, drugs or weapons for the  purpose of 
checking compliance of your conditions.
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diminished by the search clause contained in his 
co-tenant’s recognizance. The judge found the 
accused had “asserted his right to privacy”  but he 
was ignored. Thus, his s. 8 Charter right was 
breached.
The judge then went on to exclude the evidence 
under s. 24(2). First, the  police conduct was a 
serious breach of the accused’s s.  8 Charter  right. 
He had expressly told police that he did not 
consent to the  search. “Simply assuming that [his 
co-habitant’s] search clause trumped the accused’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, was 
a serious violation of section 8 of the  Charter,” 
said the judge. Second, the impact of the breach on 
the accused’s privacy rights was substantial. A 
person has a  high expectation of privacy in their 
home. Finally, the reliability  of the firearms and 
drugs and the negative impact of guns and drugs on 
society was not sufficient enough to tip the scale in 
favour of admitting the evidence. After balancing 
the relevant factors, the judge concluded the 
admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
The judge  also commented on whether the search 
conducted by police was “cursory” in nature. He 
examined the length of the total search (an hour-
and-a-half) and the manner in which it was 
conducted. “In this case, couch cushions were 
pulled back. Mattresses were lifted up,”  said the 
judge. “The contents of an opaque plastic chest of 
drawers were examined and some things ... 
removed. Cupboard doors were opened. The ledge 
behind the stove was examined as was a pile of 
garbage in the back door. A cellphone was seized 
from the top of a kitchen table.” In the judge’s 
view, the search exceeded what would be 
considered cursory - “a walkthrough to quickly 
observe what may be in plain view” - and therefore 
was not authorized by law. Since the evidence was 
excluded, the accused was acquitted of all charges. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown submitted that the 
search of the accused’s home 
did not breach his s. 8 Charter 
rights. In its view, the  police 
had the lawful authority for the warrantless search 
of the residence during each stage of the police 
search - initial entry, cursory search of the premises 
pursuant to the  co-tenant’s recognizance and 
search incident to arrest. And, even if the search 
breached s. 8, the Crown argued the trial judge 
erred in excluding the evidence under s. 24(2). 
Unreasonable Search? 
The Crown suggested that the police were legally 
authorized to initially enter the shared residence 
without a warrant based on a consent search 
condition in the recognizance of one of its 
residents. Moreover, the law was not challenged as 
being unreasonable and entry into the residence 
was conducted in a reasonable manner.
Justice Schwann, delivering the Court of Appeal 
decision, first identified considerations relevant to 
the s. 8 Charter inquiry: 
• Section 8 of the  Charter  provides that 
everyone has the right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
• Assessing whether an individual’s s.  8 rights 
have been violated involves two fundamental 
determinations: whether a search or seizure 
has taken place and, if so, whether the  search 
or seizure was reasonable. 
• The s.  8 analysis involves an examination of 
the point at which “the public’s interest in 
being left alone by government must give way 
to the  government’s interest in intruding on the 
Assessing whether an individual’s s. 8 rights have been violated involves two 
fundamental determinations: whether a search or seizure has taken place 
and, if so, whether the search or seizure was reasonable. 
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individual’s privacy in order to advance its 
goals”.
• Although s.  8 protects people not places, 
courts have  been sensitive to an individual’s 
expectation of privacy in their own home. 
• Section 8 is only engaged if the claimant first 
establishes that they  have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the place or with the 
item searched or seized.
• If s. 8 is engaged, the court must then turn to 
the question of whether the search or seizure 
was reasonable. 
• A wa r ran t l e s s s ea rch o r s e i zu re i s 
presumptively unreasonable, and the Crown 
bea r s t he bu rden o f r ebu t t i ng t h i s 
presumption. This presumption relieves the 
applicant from the burden of establishing that 
the search was unreasonable. That said, a 
party  seeking to justify a warrantless search 
bears the onus of rebutting the presumption by 
establishing the following:
(a) the search was authorized by law;
(b) the law itself is reasonable, and
(c) the manner in which the search was 
carried out was reasonable.
In this case, the trial judge did not err in 
determining that the  accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the shared residence, 
which was his own home. 
Consent Search?
“An individual may consent to a 
warrantless search,“ said Justice 
Schwann. “For the consent to be valid, 
it must be fully informed, which means 
the person in question must be 
provided with ‘sufficient available 
information to make the preference 
meaningful’. Valid consent must also be 
given voluntarily. This aspect of consent 
has been interpreted to mean that the person must 
have had a  real choice in providing the purported 
consent.”
Justice Schwann did not question whether the 
search was authorized by law as against the 
accused’s co-tenant but found the search condition 
contained in the co-tenant’s recognizance did not 
provide lawful authority for the police to enter and 
undertake a cursory search as against the accused, 
who happened to share the residence. Although 
search conditions in recognizances have been 
recognized as a form of voluntary  consent for a 
police search, the  accused’s co-resident could not 
provide consent on behalf of the accused such that 
the consent search clause contained in the co-
tenant’s recognizance operated as a waiver of the 
accused’s constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
The Court of Appeal recognized that the law with 
respect to third party  consent in relation to a joint 
residence was not clearly settled. Nevertheless, 
several provincial appellate  courts have concluded 
that a resident has the  right to permit police entry 
into common areas of a home without the consent 
of all other residents. Citing the  Supreme Court of 
Canada decision R. v. Reeves, 2018 SCC 56, Justice 
Schwann stated:
Reasoning by analogy, if I had to decide 
whether a search condition for one person can 
be relied upon as authority to effect a search 
against another person who happens to reside 
in the same home, I would conclude, broadly 
speaking, that the police may not rely on such 
authority. This question would, of course, need 
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
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to be determined against the backdrop of the 
particular facts of the case at hand. [para. 74]
Hence, the Court of Appeal found the police could 
not rely on the co-tenant’s third party consent to 
enter and search the home as a source of authority 
as against the accused.
In this case, Justice Schwann found the trial judge 
assessed co-tenant consent when he found the 
accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
shared dwelling was not diminished or attenuated 
by the search clause contained in his co-resident’s 
recognizance. And, “even if ... a resident has the 
right to permit the police to enter the common 
areas of a  shared home, ... seizure of the items 
from [this] residence cannot be justified under the 
plain view doctrine,” said Justice Schwann. “I say 
this because the trial judge made no finding of fact 
to that effect; if anything, the evidence would 
suggest otherwise. Furthermore, the plain view 
doctrine confers a seizure power not a search 
power, which ... does not permit an exploratory 
search to find other evidence.”
Admissibility of the Evidence?
The trial judge  did not err in excluding the 
evidence. He correctly identified the three 
branches of the s. 24(2) analysis - (1) the 
seriousness of the breach; (2) the impact of the 
breach on the accused’s protected interest; and (3) 
society’s interest in adjudication of the case on its 
merits. He was alive to the relevant legal principles 
and made no error in principle or unreasonable 
finding of fact that would justify an appeal court 
intervening with the deference he was owed in his 
decision to exclude the evidence.
The Crown appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Don’t let yesterday take up too much of 
today.” 
~Will Rogers~
December 6, 2019
Forensic Science in Criminal Cases: 
New Developments, Good Evidence?
In Person and Webcast
Click here
February 7, 2020
17th National Symposium on Search 
and Seizure Law in Canada
In Person and Webcast
Click here
February 27, 2020
Courtroom Testimony: A Practical 
Skills Workshop for Police and Other 
Law Enforcement Professionals
In Person and Webcast
Click here
March 2-3, 2020
13th Annual Intensive Course on 
Drafting and Reviewing Search 
Warrants
In Person and Webcast
Click here
April 3, 2020
13th National Symposium on Tech 
Crime and E-Evidence
In Person and Webcast
Click here
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2019
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug  toxicity deaths (formerly 
known as illicit drug overdose deaths) in the 
province from January  1, 2009 to August 31, 2019. 
In August 2019 there were 79 suspected drug 
toxicity deaths. This represents a -37%  decrease 
over the number of deaths occurring in August 
2018 and a -13% decrease over July 2019. 
In 2018, there were a total of 1,541 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This was an increase of 46 deaths 
over the 2017 numbers (1,495). 
Overall, the 2018 statistics amount to about four 
(4) people dying every day of the year.
The 1,541  toxicity  deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 360%  increase over 2013. The report 
also attributed fentanyl laced drugs as accounting 
for the increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2019 with 184 illicit drug toxicity deaths followed 
by 40-49 year-olds (154) and 50-59 years-old 
(152). People aged 19-29 had 123 deaths. 
Vancouver had the most deaths at 182  followed by 
Surrey (86), Victoria (35), Abbotsford (33), 
Kamloops (24), Burnaby (22), and Prince George 
(20).   
Males continue to die at 
a l m o s t a 3 : 1  r a t i o 
compared to females. In 
2019 (Jan-Aug), 528 males 
had died while there were 
162 female deaths.
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The 2019 data indicates that most illicit drug 
toxicity deaths (86%) occurred inside while 12% 
occurred outside. For 16  deaths, the location was 
unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes 
hote l s , mote l s , rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes correctional facility, police 
cell, medical facility, occupational site, or public 
building.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 41 months preceding the 
declaration (Nov 2012-Mar 2016) totaled 1,499. 
The number of deaths in the 41 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Aug 2019) totaled 
4,499. This is an increase of 3,000 deaths or 
200%.
1680
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Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths in BC - January 1, 2009 to June 
August, 2019.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 
Coroners Service. October 16, 2019.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were  fentanyl and its 
analogues, which was detected in 81.8%  of deaths, cocaine (50.0%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(32.1%), ethyl alcohol (27.1%), and heroin (17.0%). 
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
Nov 2012-Mar 2016 Apr 2016-Aug 2019
4,499
1,499
+200%
Deaths 
since 
Public 
Health 
Emergency
0
30
60
90
120
150
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
22.5 27.8
30.7
44.1
82.7
124.6 128.4
90.2
Monthly Average
Jan-Aug
Volume 19 Issue 5 ~ September/October 2019
PAGE 36
Vancouver
Surrey
Victoria
Abbotsford
Kamloops
Burnaby
Prince George
Kelowna
Nanaimo
New Westminster
Chilliwack
0 80 160 240 320 400
37
35
35
55
49
48
46
41
98
214
394
15
16
18
19
20
22
24
33
35
86
182
2019 (Jan-Aug)
2018
Illicit Drug 
Overdose Deaths 
by Township with 
15 or more deaths
up to August 2019. 
Volume 19 Issue 5 ~ September/October 2019
PAGE 37
“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
ROAD TRAFFIC 
INJURIES: THE FACTS
ROAD TRAFFIC 
INJURIES ARE THE 
8th 
LEADING CAUSE  
OF DEATH 
O F  A L L 
DEATHS 13 %
L O W - I N C O M E  COUNT R I E S
BUT
OF THE WORLD’S 1%VEHICLES
O F  A L L 
DEATHS 7 %
H I G H - I N C O M E  COUNT R I E S
BUT
OF THE WORLD’S 40%VEHICLES
1.35 MILLION
ROAD TRAFFIC DEATHS EVERY YEAR
54% 
OF DEATHS ARE PEDESTRIANS,  
CYCLISTS AND MOTORCYCLISTS
3% 28%
23%
1ST 
CAUSE OF DEATH AMONG 
CHILDREN AGED 5-14 AND AMONG 
YOUNG ADULTS AGED 15-29
EVERY 24 SECONDS  
SOMEONE DIES ON THE ROAD
#RoadSafety
source: WHO Global status report on road safety 2018
www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/2018/en/
The World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims
November 17, 2019
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2019 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2019.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
November 13-December 18, 2019
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
February 19-April 1, 2020
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
November 4-8, 2019
Forensic Digital Imaging: Documenting and 
PresentingVisual Evidence (INVE-1013) 
November 6-8, 2019
Introduction to Investigative File Management 
(INVE-1003) 
November 18, 2019
Tactical Communications (INVE 1012)
November 19-22, 2019
Conducting Internal Investigations (INVE 1011)
November 25-29, 2019
Introduction to Investigative Skills and Processes (INVE 
1003)
December 9-11, 2019
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE 1001)
January 6-7, 2020
Intro Criminal Justice System (INVE 1000)
February 3-5, 2020
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE 1001)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate, 
an academic credential that can help you pursue or 
advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
requirements for the certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate 
webpage.
Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014
15-006
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF EMERGENCY & SECURITY MANAGEMENT
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options. 
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca 
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
